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Abstract: The extended mind thesis maintains that the functional 
contributions of tools and artefacts can become so essential for our cognition 
that they can be constitutive parts of our minds. In other words, our tools 
can be on a par with our brains: our minds and cognitive processes can 
literally ‘extend’ into the tools. Several extended mind theorists have argued 
that this ‘extended’ view of the mind offers unique insights into how we 
understand, assess, and treat certain cognitive conditions. In this chapter we 
suggest that using AI extenders, i.e., tightly coupled cognitive extenders that 
are imbued with machine learning and other ‘artificially intelligent’ tools, 
presents both new ethical challenges and opportunities for mental health. 
We focus on several mental health conditions that can develop differently 
by the use of AI extenders for people with cognitive disorders and then 
discuss some of the related opportunities and challenges. 
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1    Introduction 
 
Consider two scenarios. Helen is an 80-year-old woman who was diagnosed 
with Alzheimer's a few years ago. She used to use physical labels and other 
cues at home to help support her memory. But she now wears augmented 
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reality glasses that label objects in her vision range, detect hazards when she 
is manipulating objects, indicate where things are, keep her agenda, 
recognize the faces of family and friends, and help her while navigating 
beyond her home and in many other everyday scenarios. Helen’s grandson, 
Lewis, is a 10-year-old boy with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder). He uses a special device that monitors his activity (movements, 
speech, gaze, etc.), issues recommendations through a gamified scoring 
system, sends indicators to teachers and family, and performs other well-
thought smooth interventions. The device has boosted Lewis’s self-
confidence and focus, and academic results are improving. Lewis is also 
allowed to use his device for exams, becoming the envy of his classmates.  
 
While scenarios such as those above are not yet possible with current clinical 
technologies, with current trends moving towards digital health applications 
they may become commonplace in the future. The distinctive features of 
both these cases are (1) the person is tightly coupled with a tool (a device, 
such as a smartphone, or a wearable, such as an augmented  reality headset) 
and (2) the tool integrates artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities (image 
recognition, face detection, navigation, event recognition, natural language 
processing, speech recognition, prediction, etc.). Together these features put 
tension on an “internalist” view of the mind, according to which any process 
outside the brain is considered as subsidiary to human cognition. In contrast, 
these two characteristics are in perfect alignment with the Extended Mind 
Thesis (EMT), the view that the human mind and cognition is sometimes 
constituted by more than just the brain.1 
 
In Hernández-Orallo & Vold, we introduced the notion of “AI extenders”, 
as any external tool that uses AI capabilities and is sufficiently tightly 
coupled with a person’s cognitive system that it should be  considered a 
cognitive extender more broadly.2 While in contemporary philosophy there 
has been quite a lot of discussion of the theory and potential of EMT, these 
discussions focus on relatively simple technologies. There has been almost 
no consideration of what more sophisticated emerging AI and data-enabled 
technologies can do qua cognitive extenders. We argue that with the use of 
artificial intelligence, there is a strong case that some of our cognition is 
taking place outside our brains and having deeper effects for replacing, 
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enhancing or regulating parts of our cognitive activity. In the examples 
above, we have two cases of AI extenders being used to help people with 
very different mental conditions. How are “AI extenders” going to serve and 
affect mental health, as well as our philosophical and ethical interpretation 
of treatments and interventions? Answering this question is the goal of this 
chapter. 
 
The range of mental conditions is structured in well-known classifications, 
such as the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioral Disorders 
published by the World Health Organization (WHO).3 We will analyze 
some of these conditions under the perspective of the EMT and will 
investigate how current and future AI extenders, according to the 
capabilities they provide, may lead us to new therapeutic possibilities, new 
ethical challenges and a philosophical re-understanding of some aspects of 
mental health.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the EMT, 
and its evolution towards more flexible interpretations. Section 3 gives a 
definition of AI extenders, as a particular case of cognitive extenders, 
making it distinctive from other uses of technology for mental health. 
Section 4 selects a few mental conditions and interprets them under the 
EMT. Section 5 is more explicit about the capabilities that AI tools can 
extend, how these tools can be applied to a diversity of mental conditions, 
and, how this can change in the future, especially if the EMT is accepted by 
clinicians and patients. Section 6 explores some of the positive and negative 
impacts of AI extenders, when used either with or without a therapeutic 
motivation. Finally, section 7 gives a series of recommendations to AI 
designers and clinicians, and open questions for future research. 
 
 
2    What is the Extended Mind Thesis? 
 
For a long time now most scientific investigation into the mind, e.g. in 
neuroscience and cognitive science, has considered the brain to be the sole 
physical locus of the mind. According to these brain  sciences,  the mind is 
an information processing system that sits in between sensory inputs and 
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motor outputs, and which functions by performing computations on inner 
representations of the world.4 This ‘internalist’ view is ‘neuro-centric’ in the 
sense that all of the relevant inner representations and computations are 
thought to be instantiated in neural networks in the brain, while everything 
beyond the brain is considered an input source, or an arena for outputs.5 A 
result of this demarcation of the mind is that mental disorders have also 
tended to be demarcated based on this assumed boundary of the mind, that 
is, mental disorders are thought to be brain disorders. 
 
Over the past two decades, however, a new picture of the mind has gained 
popularity, which, if true, would challenge this orthodox view. The EMT 
maintains that human thought and reason are not entirely ‘in the head’. 
Instead, the effective circuits of human thought and reason sometimes 
crucially involve the technologies we use and even our social networks and 
institutional structures, such that the physical locus of the mind is ‘extended’ 
beyond the brain.1 The technologies that are often cited as examples of 
‘extenders’, range from humble writing utensils, such as pens and pencils, 
and the external symbols they create1, to more sophisticated technologies, 
such as smartphones, as well as many things in between, including Scrabble 
tiles and Venn diagrams. We can state the EMT as follows: 
 
Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) = Representational vehicles (or 
information-bearing structures) located beyond the brain 
can be partly constitutive of an agent’s mental states and 
processes.  
 
The EMT accepts the claim that the mind is an information processing 
system—a core commitment of cognitive science—but maintains that the 
relevant information-bearing structures, that is, the vehicles of mental 
representations, can sometimes be instantiated by non-biological elements, 
beyond the brain. To put it simply, if the EMT is correct, then there is more 
to the mind than the brain. And, accordingly, at least in some cases, in order 
to explain and treat mental disorders, we may need to look beyond the brain. 
Indeed, a number of defenders of the EMT have argued that certain 
disorders, such as Alzheimer’s, borderline personality disorder, and autism, 
can be better understood, assessed, and treated by taking a wider lens on 
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physical locus of the mind—we will discuss these examples in section 4. 
But first we will discuss some of the arguments that have been used to 
support the EMT. 
 
In their seminal paper titled, ‘The Extended Mind’, Clark and Chalmers 
motivate the EMT by considerations of parity between external 
representational vehicles and internal cognitive parts.1 They describe a 
scenario intended to motivate their view which involves two people—Otto 
and Inga. Inga has a well-functioning biological memory that allows her to 
recall the location of a museum she wishes to visit and to successfully 
navigate her way there. Despite having Alzheimer’s, Otto also performs this 
task quite well, but he does so by relying on a notebook, which he uses as 
an external memory tool—recording important information and consulting 
his notes whenever needed. Clark and Chalmers argue that “in all the 
relevant respects”, Otto’s notebook plays the same functional role in guiding 
his behavior as Inga’s biological memory does for her, and so the 
information stored in Otto’s notebook should count as a part of the 
constitutive machinery of Otto’s mind just as the information stored in 
Inga’s brain does for her. Hence, their argument is based on the idea that 
external resources can make equivalent functional contributions to one’s 
cognitive processes as internal resources can. They write: 
 
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that 
part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.” 1 
(p. 8; emphasis in the original) 
This idea has come to be known as the ‘parity principle’. Arguments based 
on considerations of functional parity, like Clark and Chalmers’, represent 
the first-wave of arguments for the EMT. They have come under criticism 
on several fronts, which eventually led to a second-wave of arguments for 
the EMT. While we will not rehearse all of these criticisms here, there are a 
few worth mentioning because they are particularly relevant to the 
discussion at hand.  
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One long-standing debate around the appeal to functional parity has been 
over how to characterize the relevant functional role that Clark and 
Chalmers appeal to (this amounts to a commitment to the view that 
philosophers call ‘role functionalism’). This functional role determines in 
what ways external components must be similar to internal ones, in order to 
count as a genuine part of the mind. Clark and Chalmers, for example, 
mention three features they think are important for capturing the ways in 
which the information in Otto’s notebook is on par with the information in 
Inga’s brain: (1) both are a constant in the agent’s life, (2) both are readily 
accessible when the agent needs them, and (3) both are relied upon, such 
that the agent trusts and endorses the information without hesitation. Among 
other objections, these features have come under criticism as being too 
coarse, for at least two reasons. Some argue that certain important features 
are missing and that if the particular nuances of human biological cognitive 
functions were included, then it would be unlikely that Otto’s notebook, or 
indeed any external resources could really count as extensions.6 While 
others have argued that these three conditions alone are too coarse as they 
would allow for all sorts of external objects to count as extenders, leading 
to absurd scenarios where everything that one reads on the internet, for 
example, or the entire library that one visits, are a part of their mind.7   
 
The parity argument has further been criticized for relying on an overly 
normative picture of the mind: by letting some notion of a ‘healthy’ 
biological mind set the baseline for what could count as a possible extension 
of the mind. For example, imagine a ‘healthy’ biologically mind, like Inga’s, 
started to rely on external objects to enhance her memory. Extended mind 
theorists are generally quite supportive of the idea that cognitive extenders 
enhance healthy minds—they allow us to go beyond what the naked brain 
can do. But in order for the parity principle to support these cases, one would 
have to imagine a case that involved someone (e.g. a Martian with 
superhuman cognitive capacities) who (purely internally) had mental 
capacities that go beyond those of a ‘normal’ human. It is a roundabout way 
of arguing for what should be a straightforward commitment of the EMT. 
 
Ultimately these limitations, along with other philosophical challenges 
facing the parity principle, were in part what motivated ‘second-wave’ 
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extended mind theorists to instead appeal to a criterion of functional 
contributions rather than functional parity. Second-wave arguments focus 
on the different but complementary contributions that external and internal 
resources make to bring about cognitive functions.8,9 This style of argument 
can straightforwardly defend the possibility of enhancing ‘normal’ or 
‘healthy’ minds, and hence is able to overcome the first-wave focus on 
compensation for biological deficits. For this reason, it is likely that AI 
extenders, as we will define them in the next section, will need to appeal to 
complementarity arguments. Part of what makes AI applications so useful 
for humans is how they can go beyond our own cognitive capacities: 
processing more information, at faster speeds, and in new ways. 
 
Complementarity arguments tend to focus on how external resources can be 
appropriately integrated with internal resources such that they can jointly 
govern cognitive activities and behavior, even though their functional 
contributions are not strictly analogous (as parity had demanded). One of 
the central issues for these views is articulating exactly how inner and outer 
resources need to be integrated. Some version and selection of the features 
that Clark and Chalmers defend—constancy, accessibility, and reliability—
are often endorsed, though rarely the exact set.9-11 Heersmink, for example, 
has recently defended a multidimensional framework, including the 
dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural 
transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and 
transformation.11 We will not engage this debate here, but for the purposes 
of this chapter we broadly endorse Heersmink’s definition of ‘coupling’ as 
well as his view that each of these dimensions are a matter of degree. 
Perhaps it is most important to note that all of these dimensions are 
relational. That is, they depend on how a particular agent stands in relation 
to the tool—Does the agent rely on the tool in order to complete a cognitive 
task? Does the agent trust the information provided by the tool (rarely 
questioning its veracity?) How individualized is the tool for that particular 
agent (i.e. how difficult would it be for another agent to use it)? This would 
have to be assessed on a case by case basis.  
 
The EMT also includes cases beyond non-biological artifacts; sometimes 
people rely on the minds of others as cognitive extenders. Such cases are 
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known as ‘socially extension’. Clark and Chalmers, for example, discuss the 
possibility of Otto relying on Inga’s mind, rather than on his notebook.1 So 
long as Inga is constantly in his life, the information in her mind (about 
where the museum is located) is accessible to him when he needs it, and he 
relies on the information (trusting its veracity), thereby we could say that 
Otto’s mind extends into Inga’s. Supporting this idea is a growing body of 
research on the social distribution of cognition, which tends to focus on the 
psychology of memory and group decision-making. The theory of 
transactive memory developed by Daniel Wegner, for example, maintains 
that memory processes (including encoding, storage, and retrieval) are 
sometimes shared across stable dyads (with a particular focus on highly 
interdependent couples) and groups.12,13 Wegner explains that transactive 
memory systems involve a “set of individual memory systems in 
combination with the communication that takes place between individuals” 
(p. 186).12 Memory processes are, thus, not reducible to the internal 
processes of any particular individual in the system, as the communication 
between individuals is an essential part of the process. Extended mind 
theorists have appealed to this paradigm as one example of how a single 
agent’s cognitive process can be distributed across multiple agents.14  
 
One reason that AI extenders present a paradigm shift, as we will argue in 
the next section, is that in some important respects they are more like cases 
of social extension than extension into static artifacts. For one, AI extenders 
have some sophisticated cognitive capacities that have previously only 
existed in humans, e.g. speech recognition, facial recognition, pattern 
recognition, and so forth. This means that while traditionally there may have 
been some cognitive tasks that could have only been completed through 
socially distributed systems, in the future there may be opportunities for 
individuals to rely on AI extenders rather than other people. This could have 
plenty of upside for people who are deficient in certain capacities, like 
executive control functions, and who have traditionally had to rely on 
members of their social network for help—we will discuss the condition of 
borderline personality disorder as an example of this in the next section.  
 
There are several advantages to relying on an AI extender over another 
person. For one, in the case of highly interdependent couples it is often 
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found that each individual relies on the other in various ways (e.g. Inga 
remembers where the museum is located, while Otto remembers the best 
place to park), so there is typically some degree of reciprocity, or 
symmetry.13 But asymmetric socially extended beliefs might also be 
possible. For example, Clark and Chalmers discuss the possibility that 
someone relies on his regular waitress at the restaurant he frequents to 
determine what food he should order, thereby offloading his decision-
making.1 These asymmetric cases seem to imply, however, that one person 
is always being paid or ‘used’ for cognitive labour. AI extenders present the 
opportunity to asymmetrically rely on a cognitively sophisticated device. 
Furthermore, other agents may be less stable than an AI extender device, 
which one can own and carry with them everywhere they go.  
 
 
3    What is an ‘AI extender’? How this differs from standard 
kinds of cognitive extension 
 
As mentioned, the tools that are often cited as examples of cognitive 
extenders include both simple technologies, such as Otto and his notebook1, 
as well as more advanced tools, such as smartphones15. Both of these 
technologies had transformative effects on human cognition. The use of 
writing tools to create external symbols and write words down represented 
a major shift in human intellectual history: a move from the oral tradition to 
literacy. The smartphone has likewise been transformative—a democratized 
and powerful personal computer that travels with users wherever they go. 
While extended mind theorists have discussed smartphones15, it rarely gets 
mentioned how the computational power of smartphones has grown 
dramatically over the last few years, not only because of their processors but 
also because of the connected use of cloud services, with many apps running 
or refining pre-trained deep neural networks and other technologies. We 
argue that this increased use of machine learning, and other functionalities 
brought by artificial intelligence, is qualitatively different from the kinds of 
cognitive extension that preceded it in several ways: these systems can 
perceive, navigate, make complex decisions, recognize and produce 
language, plan, identify emotions, etc., all in complex and changing 
situations.  
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To more precisely characterize what an AI extender is, we start from a 
definition of cognitive extender as given by Hernández-Orallo & Vold, 
which was adapted from Hutchins:2,16 
 
A cognitive extender is an external physical or virtual element that 
is coupled to enable, aid, enhance, or improve cognition, such that 
all – or more than – its positive effect is lost when the element is not 
present.  
 
Again, crucially, the external physical or virtual element must be 
appropriately ‘coupled’ to be considered a cognitive extender. That is, the 
right conditions must be met in order for an artifact to count as a literal part 
of an agent’s mind (i.e. on a par with the brain); and only when these 
conditions are met is the mind extended.  
 
In contrast, AI extenders are an increasingly important and distinctive 
subkind of cognitive extender that are distinguished by their use of a 
particular kind of technology – AI –  and their distinct implications (to be 
discussed in later sections). Here is a more precise definition: 
  
An AI extender is a cognitive extender that is “fueled” by AI. This 
means that some AI technology is directly responsible for the 
cognitive capability that the extender is able to deploy, in 
conjunction with its user. 
 
With the above two definitions, what counts as an AI extender is precise, as 
far as what count as AI is precise. Today, we associate AI with a range of 
possibilities such as image and speech recognition, machine translation and 
planning, many of them realized through machine learning. However, AI 
will cover more and more cognitive capabilities, as we further characterize 
in section 5. 
 
Those working in psychiatry and clinical neuroscience may be familiar with 
related terminologies such as “cognitive assistants” or “cognitive 
prosthetics”. It is therefore important to be clear about what distinguishes 
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AI extenders from these well-entrenched applications and what justifies the 
introduction of this new category. The crucial distinction here is that, as a 
subspecies of cognitive extenders, AI extenders challenge the internalist 
view of the mind: AI extenders are a part of an agent’s wide existing 
cognitive system, they perform cognitive functions for a human agent—just 
as the brain does. It is this rather strong metaphysical claim that 
distinguishes them from mere “cognitive assistants” or “cognitive 
prosthetics”. This metaphysical claim is important for many ethical and 
policy implications that we will discuss in the next sections, and how these 
systems have to be regulated and built. For instance, following the examples 
we gave in the introduction, the definition above includes Helen’s 
augmented reality glasses, which means that they have to be designed, in the 
first place, by considering how Helen’s cognitive processing is going to 
change with their use. This may be an important, but secondary design 
principle, when considering some other devices that the above definition 
excludes, such as autonomous vehicles or cognitive robots that interact with 
humans occasionally (but are not tightly coupled), or an exoskeleton or a 
“smart” shoe that use ML algorithms to stabilize the body, but are not really 
providing cognitive functions to the user.  
 
To be more precise, we might say that AI extenders (and cognitive extenders 
more broadly) are themselves a subset of cognitive assistants, while not all 
cognitive assistants are extenders. Certainly, AI extenders provide cognitive 
assistance or “cognitive services”.17 For example, Helen’s augmented reality 
glasses and Lewis’s monitor system perform sophisticated cognitive 
processes: from perception to planning, and as such they both serve as 
cognitive assistants. But AI extenders are distinguished from the broader 
category of cognitive assistants by the degree of coupling (following, e.g., 
the dimensions from Heersmink, as mentioned above).11  It is this tight 
coupling that, so the argument for the EMT maintains, warrants us calling 
them a part of the agent’s mind and thereby challenges the commitment to 
internalism. A cognitive extender is not merely processing inputs and 
producing outputs (such as an online machine translator); it is the locus of 
states that are created and accessed at any time by the human agent.  
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AI extenders should similarly be distinguished from cognitive prosthetics 
(sometimes also referred to as “orthosis”), a term that comprises many 
systems that can be attached to (and detached from) humans and can help or 
completely replace some lost or nonexistent cognitive human function. 
Originally, a cognitive prosthesis was defined as “a compensatory strategy 
that changes the environment and focuses on functional activities [...] 
designed specifically for rehabilitation purposes” (p. 41).18 However, many 
so-called cognitive prosthetics are simple software or hardware devices, that 
are not tightly coupled and that are not “fueled” by AI; in some cases there 
is no information processing or otherwise intelligent processing happening 
on them, like a stick compared to a leg. In other cases, no attachment (or 
coupling) takes place. In learning environments, for example, any device in 
a classroom is said to be cognitive prosthetics.19 In our view, even if the 
trend today is to use the notion of cognitive prosthetics for interventions that 
involve some computing technology20, many of these cannot be considered 
AI extenders due to a lack of appropriate coupling. As a result, many 
cognitive prosthetics do not carry with them any interesting metaphysical 
claim. They do not challenge the internalist picture of the mind, and as a 
result they come with a distinct (though perhaps overlapping) set of risks 
and opportunities from those we will discuss around AI extenders.  
 
The categories of AI extenders and cognitive prostheses may be overlapping 
at times (i.e. they are not mutually exclusive) but they are also not identical. 
Some cognitive prostheses really are appropriately coupled to an agent and 
do make use of AI technologies. For instance, one of the early AI extenders 
was COACH (Cognitive Orthosis for Assisting aCtivities in the Home), a 
device that uses AI to observe, supervise and assist people with dementia, 
“learn from his or her actions, and issue prerecorded cues of varying 
detail”21 or Solo, another prototype that used planning and other AI 
techniques to help “cognitively impaired clients and their caregivers in 
managing their daily activities”.22 These intelligent assistance devices for 
people with dementia are perhaps the best current clinical examples of AI 
extenders. Many of these research prototypes are now superseded by 
commercial products, and in cases targeting the general public, such as Ellie, 
Woebot and Tess, with some of them known as virtual cognitive behavior 
therapists23 a term borrowed from the early days of ELIZA, the famous 
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computer therapist.24 Because the relevant dimensions that characterize the 
appropriate coupling necessary for cognitive extension are relational in 
nature, these AI-driven cognitive prosthetics may in some cases also count 
as AI extenders.  
 
Our definition of AI extenders also suggests why second-wave arguments 
for the extended mind thesis are better able to support the possibility of AI 
extenders. This is because the way that machine learning systems process 
information is likely to be relevantly dissimilar from the ways that humans 
do. Furthermore, as we have seen, the performance capacities of AI 
extenders far exceed what a notebook or a calculator can do, or even (in 
some respects) what a human mind can do. Indeed, AI can do much more 
than analogous functions (as a parity-driven argument for the EMT would 
require). As covered by this and other volumes, AI can lead to better 
diagnosis, prognosis and treatments in mental health25, and robotic and 
virtual systems are treating people with dementia, autism, and other 
conditions, educating children with developmental disabilities, on top of a 
range of possibilities for training, consultation, healthcare management. 
Meanwhile, the area of affective computing is making machines able to 
detect and react to emotional states, where machine learning can create high-
level representations from sensors on the body and brain-computer 
interfaces, detecting normal and abnormal situations.  
 
Under the scope of AI extenders we consider all these possibilities, with the 
condition that the system must be appropriately coupled with the person 
such that the effect is lost without the extender. An occasional or detached 
use of a robotic therapist is not an AI extender (not coupled). The use of 
augmented reality to treat a phobia (so that the patient is “cured”) is not 
either (the effect is permanent). Though both of these technologies might be 
considered as cognitive assistants.26  
 
Finally, this range of examples of AI extenders is indicative of just how 
broad and inclusive the category is intended to be. It can include a rather 
heterogenous set of technological applications. A companion robot could be 
an AI extender for the same reasons that we consider social extenders to be, 
for example. Some kinds of ambient intelligence (beyond smart homes and 
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buildings), such as the Persuasive Mirror, could also count.27 Probably the 
most obvious cases will involve software tools, such as decision-making 
support systems, or tools that are designed in ways that easily satisfy the 
relevant dimensions of coupling: applications on one’s smartphone, for 
example, are well-suited to fit these criteria, because of how portable our 
phones are, how much personal information they track, how readily 
accessible their applications are to us, how likely we are to trust and rely on 
the information they provide us, and so forth. Even though AI extenders can 
be heterogenous in terms of their physical properties and instantiations, what 
makes them a cohesive category (distinct from cognitive assistances, 
cognitive prosthetics, and even other kinds of cognitive extenders), worthy 
of discussion is the role they play in the cognitive lives of humans and the 
ethical and design considerations that emerge from this context. This is true 
even though we are still in early stages of developing AI for use in clinical 
settings (especially systems that interact directly with the user). For this 
reason, our chapter focuses more on future possibilities around how AI 
could be used to extend cognition, in the context of mental health, exploring 
the risks, and the design and policy implications around how we might deal 
with these future scenarios.  
 
 
4    How the extended mind can change our understanding, 
assessment, and treatment of cognitive disorders 
 
By now, numerous authors have described how the EMT can improve either 
how we understand, assess, or treat mental and behavioral disorders though 
few have focused specifically on the kinds of intelligent assistive 
technologies that we have termed ‘AI extenders’.28-33 In this section we will 
review some of this work.  
 
When it comes to understanding disorders, the central point that extended 
mind theorists tend to make is that there can be constitutive factors that lie 
outside the brain, and hence to fully understand a disorder one cannot look 
to the brain alone. Simply put, there are cases of cognitive impairment that 
do not involve impairments of the brain. The issue of assessment is related 
to this point. Some of the standardized tests for cognitive function assume 
**Final Draft - Please cite published version**
15 
an internalist picture, focusing only on what the brain of a patient is capable 
of (for example, by testing them without tools or assistive technologies). In 
doing so, these tests often disregard the real-life circumstances of the 
individual, which may involve the use of tools that make essential 
contributions to their cognitive functioning.31-33 As a result, test scores can 
skew the picture of how ‘well’ a patient is really doing and what they are 
really capable of. Hence, even if a patient has a cognitive impairment with 
a neuro-explanation, this might not impair their functioning in everyday life.  
 
Finally, the matter of treatment is about how to view the different techniques 
available for rehabilitation. Researchers working on cognitive impairment 
in various domains have drawn distinctions between different kinds of 
rehabilitative strategies,34,35 which several extended mind theorists have 
employed to help draw out the difference between the internalist and 
externalist views on treatment.31,33 “Restorative” strategies aim to directly 
address an individual’s cognitive impairment by restoring their ability to 
perform tasks in just the same way that a non-impaired individual would. 
“Compensatory” strategies, on the other hand, attempt to circumvent 
impairment by helping the individual perform the same tasks but in different 
ways, namely by using assistive technologies.31 Cognitive prosthetics and 
cognitive orthosis tools, like COACH and SOLO discussed above, were 
built as compensatory strategies—ways of substituting for biological 
deficits that could not be directly addressed.18,21 Because the internalist 
picture says that all cognition is a function of the brain alone, on this view 
restorative strategies must involve repairing one’s internal neuro-capacities, 
as this is the only ‘true’ way to improve a person’s cognition. King explains 
that an internalist would view compensatory strategies as a second-best 
option; while assistive technologies might help an individual compensate 
for impairment, they do not actually fix the problem.31 In contrast, because 
the EMT sees cognition as constitutively involving more than just the brain, 
it can view both rehabilitative strategies as genuinely restoring cognitive 
capabilities.  
 
In what follows we will discuss five illustrative examples of cognitive 
disorders that extended mind theorists have argued can be understood in the 
light of the EMT.  
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4.1 Alzheimer’s disease 
 
In their now much-discussed example, Clark and Chalmers describe Otto as 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, a degenerative cerebral condition 
characterized by a slow deterioration of multiple higher cognitive 
functions.1,3 They describe Otto as being able to function normally, despite 
his deteriorating biological memory, by relying on his ‘extended’ memory, 
namely, the information that he records in his notebook. The example 
suggests that by taking this wider view of the mind we might develop new 
ways of assessing and treating Alzheimer’s, as well as other kinds of 
dementia.  
            
Drayson and Clark discuss a compelling real-life case that brings this point 
to life.33 An inner-city group of Alzheimer’s sufferers had scored so 
dismally on standard tests for Alzheimer’s, such as the Consortium to 
Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease (CERAD) protocol, that 
doctors had anticipated the patients would need to be relocated to full-care 
hospitals. Yet, the patients perplexed doctors as they continued to be able to 
cope with the demands of daily life and to successfully live alone in a 
complex urban environment. Upon making home visits, doctors found that 
these patients had each transformed their home environments, creating 
ingenious personalized cognitive tools, props, and aids that supported their 
memory: from open storage cabinets, to notes and labels indicating what to 
do and when, as well as who each person was in their family photos. 
 
Because the CERAD protocol only tests biological memory it could not 
explain how these patients continued to effectively function in the world. 
What is more, if doctors had taken the tests of internal memory as the only 
standard, these patients might have been forcefully relocated to controlled 
hospital settings much sooner than necessary. Drayson and Clark note that 
the relocation of Alzheimer’s patients is often a fateful turning point in 
which their conditions become more severe.33 From the EMT perspective, 
this is not surprising; one would predict that removing patients from their 
supportive environments would have a detrimental effect on their 
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functioning. The same could be said about the example of Helen, who we 
discussed in our introduction. Helen relied on augmented reality glasses that 
had been designed to support her memory and perception. Her case is an 
evolution where most of the physical cognitive tools, props, and aids in her 
home are replaced by a single tightly coupled device, an AI extender, going 
much beyond what Drayson and Clark found in the real case. Hence, by 
taking the wider ‘extended’ view of memory and other cognitive functions 
not only are we able to explain how these patients could continue to 
function, despite low test scores, we might also rethink how we assess and 
treat sufferers of Alzheimer's.  
 
 
4.2 Learning disabilities and disorders 
 
A learning disability affects the way a person is able to problem-solve, plan, 
and acquire new knowledge and skills.3 King argues that adopting the neuro-
centric internalist view of the mind commits one to problematic views about 
the cognitive capabilities of learning-disabled individuals, whereas the EMT 
allows us to more accurately assess and treat them.31 King describes the 
fictional case of learning-disabled woman named Dana. Without any tools, 
Dana struggles to compare and evaluate various relevant factors for making 
decisions. She is, however, perfectly capable of making good complex 
decisions when she uses a graphic organizer such as a Venn diagram. This 
visuo-spatial way of representing information allows her to evaluate 
relevant factors, and to reach a good conclusion. Indeed, when using this 
assistive technology, Dana’s decision-making skills are just as good as 
anyone else’s (p. 49).31 So is Dana capable of making decisions or not? How 
should we assess her capacities? 
 
Notice that Dana’s use of an assistive technology counts as a compensatory 
rehabilitative strategy—much like the Alzheimer’s patients who had relied 
on external resources in their environments. Hence, internalists would have 
to maintain that Dana has not really been ‘cured’ because her capacities have 
not been restored, and so, even with the assistive technology, she cannot 
really make good complex decisions. Indeed, King nicely explains that the 
internalist is committed to an inverse relation between the extent to which 
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an individual relies on external tools and the extent to which she, as an agent, 
is really engaging in some cognitive process. This means that Dana is only 
“doing” as much, cognitively speaking, as her neurons are doing (p. 56).31 
And therefore, she only merits “cognitive credit” for what her neurons do, 
not the cognitive work that is done by whatever assistive devices she 
employs. The internalist is, thus, forced to say that Dana has less cognitive 
capacities and deserves less cognitive credit than someone who could 
perform the same task ‘intracranially’. This carries practical implications, as 
by adopting the stricter restorative conception of "cure" we may give 
preference for alternative internalist treatments, even if they are less 
effective (or have undesirable side-effects) for the wellbeing of the patient. 
 
King argues that we should resist internalism in favor of the EMT, which 
instead allows us to say that while Dana may need to rely on graphic 
organizers, she is quite capable of making complex decisions. On this view, 
teaching Dana how to effectively use assistive technologies (that will be 
readily available in her everyday life) is as good as any restorative strategy. 
Furthermore, Dana should get the same “cognitive credit” as someone who 
is able to complete a similar task without the assistive technology (i.e. 
internally).31 Heersmink and Knight have similarly argued that education 
and assessment should take into account how agents are able to assemble 
and use tools in their environment as extended cognitive systems, discussing 
in particular students’ use of the internet during exams.32 We can draw a 
similar lesson for the 10-year old, Lewis, who (as we described in our 
introduction) relies on an AI extender to help aid some of the learning-
related symptoms of ADHD. If one takes the extended approach, Lewis 
should get recognition and credit for his improved academic results, even 
though he could not achieve these results without his assistive device.  
 
 
4.3 Addiction 
 
The ICD-10 clinical definition of dependence syndrome, henceforth 
‘addiction’, includes a cluster of physiological, behavioral, and cognitive 
phenomena in which the use of a substance takes on a much higher priority 
or value in one’s life than is usual (p. 69).3 Diagnostic symptoms include a 
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compulsion to take the substance, difficulties in controlling substance-
taking behavior, and neglect of alternative pleasures or interests. Levy 
argues that adopting the EMT is useful in treating addiction because of how 
it can help support self-control interests.i, 28 
 
Internalism promotes the idea that the only way to recover from addiction is 
to change one’s mind: addiction is entirely a matter of ‘will-power’ and the 
addict just needs to ‘say no’ to their cravings (pp. 219–220).28 On this view, 
addicts tend to be held more responsible for not overcoming their addictions. 
But Levy cites research on ‘ego-depletion’—the idea that self-control draws 
on a limited pool of (internal) mental resources—which suggests that addicts 
have depleted self-control and thus they experience more difficulty in 
resisting their cravings than one who craves but is not addicted. If this is 
true, then it may be “literally impossible” for an addict to resist taking the 
substance they crave when it is available to them and their will-power is 
depleted (p. 219).28 the EMT is useful here as it points us to the agent’s wider 
environment to look for new methods of treatment. Levy suggests, for 
example, that environmental modifications, including the use of technology 
and social support systems, can be quite effective at helping overcome 
addiction (other work in ‘positive computing’ also supports this).36  Social 
support is perhaps closer to the use of AI extenders insofar as they can detect 
when a person is feeling weak in controlling their impulses and needs 
coaching or nudging.  
 
As just one example, a system could learn what kind of situations make self-
control more difficult for a particular individual. For instance, smokers 
usually associate tobacco with some situations (e.g., pubs, coffee, etc.) and 
less with others (e.g., going for a walk). So for a particular person, a machine 
learning system could detect that the person is likely to have depleted self-
control when meeting with certain friends or going to certain places where 
they used to smoke. Suggesting walking routes that avoid smoking zones, 
or even reminding the agent that these situations may be challenging (and 
 
i This is not an exhaustive list, but rather a selection from the ICD-10 Diagnostic 
guidelines for Dependence syndrome. 
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perhaps directing them to resources) might help them in controlling their 
impulses. 
 
 
4.4 Borderline Personality Disorder 
 
Bray argues that the EMT can offer a better understanding of certain 
personality disorders, such as Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD).29 
Personality disorders usually involve lasting and inflexible adverse patterns 
of thinking and feeling about oneself and others that impair how an 
individual functions in many aspects of life.3 Because they can include 
affective dysregulation, cognitive and perceptual distortions, and impulsive 
behavior, they tend to be thought of as a subclass of mental and behavioral 
disorders.ii,3 BPD is characterized by emotional instability and disorders of 
mood that affect how a person relates with others. Its symptoms include a 
deficit in one’s ability to perform certain high-level cognitive tasks, such as 
emotional regulation and impulse control, disturbed patterns of thinking or 
self-perception, and “a liability to become involved in intense but unstable 
relationships” (p. 160).3  
 
Bray suggests that because people with BPD have a meta-cognitive deficit, 
it is possible that they are more likely to rely on those around them as a way 
to help supplement their internal, biological deficit.29 Recall the possibility 
of social cognitive extension—where one agent relies on the information 
and abilities of another agent as an ‘extension’ of her cognitive system. Bray 
argues that people with BPD may form particularly close dyads with others, 
especially romantic partners, friends, or family members, in an attempt to 
make use of their executive functions, as this is the only kind of coupling 
that can fill the deficit in their own biological cognitive system.  
 
This could explain why people with BPD tend to form “unusually intense” 
relationships, why they suffer from a fear of abandonment, and why they are 
typically “devastated” when these relationships end.29 As we say above, in 
order to cognitively extend, one needs a tight coupling with the external 
 
ii They are categorized as mental disorders in the ICD-10. 
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element, e.g. a stable, reliable, and high-bandwidth connection with the 
‘extender’ (among, perhaps, other features).11 But reliance on others has 
certain inherent drawbacks, Bray explains: “Imagine what it would be like 
if important parts of your own brain were able to detach themselves at will 
and wander away for indeterminate periods, perhaps never to return.”29 For 
the BPD sufferer, this is how he views the people in his life, with whom he 
has formed close ‘couplings’. If these people up and leave, he would be left 
without the ability to self-regulate, to control his emotions or impulses. This 
also points to one way in which AI extenders could be used for treatment—
AI extenders could replicate some of these metacognitive skills while at the 
same time being more reliable than social extenders. We will pick up on this 
below where we discuss the benefits of AI extenders.  
 
 
4.5 Autistic Disorders 
 
Autistic disorders are ‘pervasive developmental disorders’ characterized by 
deficits in social interactions and social communication, and restricted and 
repetitive patterns of behaviors, interests, or activities (p. 198).3 Krueger and 
Maiese maintain that while there is no current consensus on the cause of 
autism, the most popular explanations over the last several decades appeal 
to a Theory of Mind deficit.37 The result of this has been to think of the 
disorder as a disturbance confined to the head of the individual—that is, to 
assume an internalist perspective. This in turn has shaped the typical 
treatment and intervention strategies, which are generally aimed at helping 
individuals develop their mind-modelling capacities. While this may be one 
helpful technique, Krueger and Maiese argue this perspective overlooks the 
fundamentally embodied and relational factors which contribute to autism 
and in doing so also overlooks potential treatment strategies.37 
 
Krueger and Maiese argue, for example, that people with autism typically 
suffer from “style blindness”—they have “a perceptual inability to extract 
socially salient information from the qualitative kinematics of others’ 
actions” (p. 24).37 This explains why they often cannot pick up on subtle 
social cues (e.g. non-verbal communicative behaviors, such as gestures and 
facial expressions) and why they struggle to understand figurative language. 
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But there is evidence that this lack of access to social norms is not “in 
principle”, as people with autism can access and abide by social norms of 
their own group (i.e. other autistics) and when norms are made explicit (p. 
23).37 Hence, instead of only employing restorative strategies with the 
expectation that people with autism need to develop their internal mind-
modelling capacities, we might also use AI extenders for compensatory 
strategies aimed at making social cues (such as categorizing the tone of 
voice or body language for the user) and the meaning of figurative language 
more ‘visible’.  
 
Another example is how we think about and treat the characteristic 
movements and behaviors of people with autism, which can consist of 
“hand-flapping, finger-snapping, tapping objects, repetitive vocalizations, 
or rocking back and forth” (p. 27).37 According to Krueger and Maiese, these 
are typically viewed as meaningless reflexes or nervous tics, but in fact these 
behaviors (sometimes called “self-stimulations” or “self-stims”) may be 
strategic deployments used to organize incoming sensory information—for 
example, to occlude signal noise when incoming information threatens to be 
overwhelming, or to heighten arousal in order to better access salient 
information (ibid). But standard ‘internalist’ treatment programs have 
traditionally tried to eliminate or suppress self-stims, whereas a wider 
approach could recognize their important role as embodied cognitive coping 
strategies, and even try to foster these strategies. For instance, an AI 
extender could be designed to find and produce appropriate stims (the most 
effective and least visible for other people).  
 
 
5    The specific effects of AI extenders on mental health  
 
An AI extender can come in different forms: a device (e.g., a tablet), a 
wearable (e.g., a watch), or an app or service that is available across different 
platforms (physical personal assistant and computer). These tools can be 
generic (e.g., a navigation system or an agenda), can be addressed to a range 
of mental health issues (e.g., a monitoring system) or can be devised for a 
particular condition (e.g., an anti-stress app).  
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If we start with generic AI extenders, they are usually devised to improve or 
compensate for one or more cognitive abilities. In Hernández-Orallo & 
Vold, we identified 14 cognitive abilities in which AI can extend cognition 
(the full definition can be found in that paper).2 These capabilities are 
reproduced in Tab. 1. The table also includes examples of AI extenders for 
each ability, either in general (non-clinical applications, second column) or 
for mental health (clinical application, third column). General applications 
may be motivated by comfort or efficiency; e.g., most people do not use 
GPS navigation devices to compensate for any limitation, but as an 
enhancement. Clinical applications of AI extenders aim at—although not 
exclusively—compensatory uses. The capabilities in Tab. 1have effects on 
many daily tasks and are expected to generate a range of applications as 
soon as AI can enhance or compensate them.  
 
Capability General Examples Clinical Examples  
MP: 
Memory  
processes 
Automated reminders or prompts; new custom-
ized mnemonics to improve long-term memory, 
or tag our experiences with related people, 
concepts and other situations to improve epi-
sodic memory.  
Apps telling an 
Alzheimer’s patient 
whether something has 
already been done, said 
or visited before. 
SI: 
Sensorimotor  
interaction 
Pattern-recognition systems; mixing represen-
tations through generative models; intelligent 
sensors and actuators 
Haptic/robotic clothing 
aides for people with Par-
kinson’s disease. 
VP: 
Visual  
processing 
Object and scene recognition or colour-recog-
nition tools for visually-impaired; facial recogni-
tion; augmented reality; intelligent filters and 
lens 
Scene sketchers to con-
trast visual hallucinations 
in patients with schizo-
phrenia 
AP: 
Auditory  
processing 
Voice-to-text applications for hearing-impaired; 
highlighting parts of speech that might be 
missed; following multiple conversations and 
prompting the user based on modeled inter-
ests; music apps.  
Ambient and speech 
recognition systems to 
contrast auditory halluci-
nations in patients with 
schizophrenia 
AS: 
Attention  
and search 
Modelling user interests and goals to focus our 
attention; e.g. through text search or 
summaries, web search engines, or with object 
recognition  
Attention focusing 
devices for patients with 
attention deficit disorders 
Pl: 
Planning 
Automated agendas, daily task planners, and 
prompts based on modelling of user’s goals 
and interests 
Daily task organizers for a 
patient with moderate 
mental retardation 
CE: 
Comprehension  
and expression 
Digital writing assistance tools using natural 
language processing (e.g. Grammarly); 
automated re-writing or re-rendering to improve 
interpretability (for reading, watching films, 
listening to music) 
Vocabulary and grammar 
assistance tools for a 
patient with some 
language disorders 
**Final Draft - Please cite published version**
24  
CO: 
Communication 
Automated emails, social media posts; 
improved intelligence in communication; 
effective spreading memes or ideas. 
Effective communication 
tools for people with 
Asperger’s 
ES: 
Emotion and  
self-control 
Systems that predict and inform us of our 
emotional states and those of others, help us 
detect fake emotions in others, or trigger our 
emotional responses. 
Systems recognizing 
emotional states of 
people for patients with 
autism. 
NV: 
Navigation 
GPS apps (e.g. Waze), building associations 
between places, routes, and our cognitive states 
to help with route-finding, safe-walking, or 
orientation 
Route assistants to safely 
navigate surroundings for 
people with dementia 
CL: 
Conceptualization, 
learning and  
abstraction 
Machine learning apps helping find new 
categories, concepts or possibilities, e.g. new 
patterns about daily or public events; new 
personalized learning strategies.  
Personalized learning 
assistants for people with 
learning disorders or 
disabilities. 
QL: 
Quantitative and  
logical reasoning 
AI systems that process uncertainty (e.g. risk or 
number of accidents), or quantities (e.g. people 
in a room) in real time 
Diet analyzers and 
estimators for patients 
suffering from anorexia. 
MS: 
Mind modeling and 
social interaction 
Modelling social networks to help anticipate 
decisions, actions, and interests of other people 
Apps determining double 
meanings in 
conversations, for people 
with Asperger’s. 
MC: 
Metacognition 
Self-tracking and analysis can help identify the 
potential and limitations of users, making users 
more aware of their own capacities 
Systems monitoring self-
esteem and confidence in 
depression episodes. 
 
Table 1 The left-hand column indicates fourteen cognitive capabilities that can be 
extended by AI, the middle column provides examples of the kind of AI application 
that can achieve this (full account in Hernández-Orallo & Vold 2019). The right-
hand column shows particular clinical examples in mental health. 
 
Having limitations for one or more of them can indirectly (i.e. as a side-
effect) cause many mental conditions, such as stress, depression or loss of 
self-esteem, as the subject feels unable to do things that other people do 
easily. All these capabilities have effects on cognition and development, so 
they are linked to mental and behavioral disorders in one way or another 
(i.e. the consequences and side-effects can be numerous). In other words, 
any extender using AI that can alleviate or compensate some cognitive 
limitations could have, in principle, positive effects on some of these 
conditions. This is sometimes referred to as the “mental capital — the 
cognitive and emotional resources that influence how well an individual is 
able to contribute to society and experience a high quality of life”, and 
increasing this capital could “mitigate the risk of disorders such as 
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depression, substance-use disorders, bipolar disorder and dementia” 
(Sahakian, p.c.).38 
 
 
In order to determine the way AI extenders can impact on various mental 
conditions, we analyzed one standard classification of mental and behavioral 
conditions, the WHO’s ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioral 
Disorders.3 This classification (as explained in the ICD-10 “blue book”) is 
a comprehensive list including the clinical descriptions of the conditions. 
One shortcoming is that it excludes some related conditions, such as 
Parkinson’s disease, which are classified as diseases of the nervous system, 
but whose symptoms might  nonetheless be improved by AI extenders 
addressing the 14 capacities in Tab. 1 (e.g. changes in communication, or 
sensorimotor function). 
 
From this list of conditions (each with an ICD assigned code starting with 
“F”), we identified those that are associated with each of the cognitive 
capabilities shown in Table 1. By ‘associated’ we mean that a variation in 
the cognitive capacity, i.e. either an increase or decrease, will have a direct 
effect on the mental or behavioral condition. For each capability we 
searched through the ICD-10 for a series of tokensiii. For instance, for 
sensorimotor interaction (SI), we looked for “sensor*” and “moto*”, and 
checked (manually) whether the reference made sense (e.g. was it actually 
talking about an association in the form of a cause or a symptom?). Table 2 
shows the result of this analysis. It highlights which of the 14 cognitive 
capabilities have a direct effect on mental health conditions.  
 
 
iii The full list of items used for each capability can be found in the Appendix A. 
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Table 2 Association between mental conditions (rows) and the capabilities that can 
be extended by AI (columns, as per Table 1). A black solid cell means that the whole 
category of mental conditions is affected by the capability, a grey cell means that 
this is the case only for some of the subcategories (the code of the affected 
subcategory or subcategories appears in the cell), and empty cells mean no 
association. 
 
There are a few things to note about Tab. 2. First, it must be understood as 
showing ‘direct’ effects of AI extenders rather than any potential side effects 
they might have on mental conditions. For instance, a visual processing 
system (so providing VP capabilities) that objectively describes what is on 
the patient’s scene might help discard the false perceptions that come from 
hallucinations (as captured by “F05 Delirium”). This applies not only to 
visual and auditory inputs, but also some other misperceptions (e.g., “that 
person is looking at me all the time”, or “he is following me”, etc.). In this 
way, AI systems can be an alternative source to perceive reality, which can 
help, in some cases, discard those false perceptions (sensory, emotional, 
etc.) that are common in many mental conditions. Note that in this example, 
the AI extender has a direct effect on mental conditions that involve 
**Final Draft - Please cite published version**
27 
hallucinations. These same systems might also have the side-effect of 
improving conditions that involve one’s reasoning or planning, e.g. 
personality disorders, but we do not include these in the corresponding right-
hand column.  
 
Second, for many of these conditions the ICD-10 explicitly states that the 
cause is unknown, and the clinical descriptions include lists of symptoms 
and diagnostic guidelines that are based on an assessment of the presence or 
absence of certain features or characteristics. Hence, in many cases the best 
that we can predict is that AI extenders will have a direct effect on 
alleviating the symptoms (rather than addressing the causes) of the 
conditions listed.  
 
Finally, Tab. 2 can be used to recognize the potential of an AI extender 
featuring a capability (or research in one particular area of AI) for a range 
of mental conditions. For instance, it is no surprise that MS (mind modeling 
and social interaction) is associated with many conditions, but it is was less 
expected perhaps that AP (auditory processing) had such a number of 
repercussions. This is especially interesting as the state of the art of AI in 
auditory perception has improved significantly during the years, and its 
integration with hearing aids may be on its way. Table 2 can also be read in 
the other direction. If we want to treat or improve the state of patients having 
some particular condition, we must look at the matrix and see what cognitive 
capabilities we need to imbue on a system. For instance, sleepwalking (or 
‘somnambulism’) could be treated with some device that, through the use of 
AI, could follow where the patient is moving and check for obstacles and 
hazards. The table is a first approximation, but it can be valuable to have a 
first understanding of the many possibilities of AI (and AI extenders in 
particular) for mental health. 
 
From all the abilities in Tab. 1, metacognition is perhaps the most critical 
one to discuss. This is for two reasons, first because of the methodology we 
had to employ in searching the ICD-10 bluebook for associated conditions 
in Tab. 2, and second because of how it is (we believe) associated with so 
many different disorders. In the first case, we note that the term 
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‘metacognition’ does not appear at all in the ICD-10 bluebook.iv 
Nonetheless we believe that metacognition has wide associations with many 
of the conditions listed because of how a patient must realize their own 
limitations related to their particular condition. Many patients, for example, 
improve simply by being diagnosed (“Now I understand what is happening 
to me”). Relatedly, treatment and care are much easier when this is known.39 
In the context of cognitive extension, however, it is very important that the 
person realizes how the added AI extenders change the person’s capabilities, 
so what the person does and what the person thinks she or he does—which 
the diagnosis clarified—are kept aligned with the use of AI extenders. A 
planned and temporary removal of an AI extender can be very helpful for 
this alignment, in the same way that hearing-impaired people realize how 
bad their condition is when they compare hearing with and without their 
hearing aids. This is also related to a placebo effect that may appear with the 
use of AI extenders, simply because the person thinks that he or she now has 
“superpowers” or a subsystem to rely on, which may boost his or her 
confidence. 
 
Other AI extenders may be more focused towards monitoring and 
intervention rather than enhancing or replacing some cognitive capabilities. 
A monitoring system using machine learning to determine when a person is 
more likely to have an outburst or a crisis can be considered an AI extender 
as much as it extends our self-awareness, in the sense of an internal 
perception of indicators in our bodies that we can understand and react to 
accordingly. If the tool also makes recommendations or interventions, we 
can still consider it an AI extender, which helps the patient with self-control, 
awareness of the situation, or simply suggesting the best actions, and so 
forth. In other words, monitoring and recommendations can be seen as 
extenders at the metacognition and decision-making levels. 
 
 
6    Potentialities and Challenges of AI Extenders 
 
 
iv  We instead had to search for related terms such as awareness, capabilities, 
limitations, consciousness, self-confidence, etc. (see Appendix A for a complete 
list). 
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There are many potential benefits of the use of AI extenders for mental 
health—both for helping those who are cognitively impaired (which is our 
focus in this chapter), but also for healthy users, who rely on digital devices 
as cognitive enhancers. In this section we will focus on five benefits, 
followed by five risks.  
 
1. AI extenders inherit all the benefits of using non-invasive 
treatments, something that is shared with (physical) orthopedics, in 
terms of flexibility, updates, repair and removal. The use of machine 
learning can (a) improve the degree of personalization, as systems 
can learn and improve their behaviour from the information they 
collect, and (b) make sense of a wider data set about one’s lifestyle 
(i.e. one that looks beyond the biological individual) than a doctor 
ever could—including information about one’s social life, screen 
time, the environments one spends time in, etc. Collecting and 
analyzing this wider data set could eventually allow for a better 
understanding, assessment and treatment of mental health 
conditions. These benefits are available for both cognitively 
impaired and cognitively health users.  
 
2. Under the lens of the EMT, we can consider the use of an AI 
extender as a genuine cure provided the system is reliable and 
integrated. Traditionally, a “cure” is some intervention that aims to 
directly address the cognitive deficit by making underlying 
mechanistic functions work better or by limiting their negative 
effects (what we describe as ‘restorative’ strategies above). With an 
AI extender, however, we instead aim to design a system that is able 
to compensate for those malfunctioning underlying mechanisms. 
With the right kind of device integration (or ‘coupling’), if a person 
gets used to giving a description of a scene or determining false 
memories or perceptions from true ones using a device, this could 
ultimately be incorporated as part of their cognition, and help cancel 
or replace those malfunctioning biological processes. When this 
happens, we argue, the new situation can be assimilated to being 
“cured” or “back to a safe condition”. 
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3. AI extenders may be a good option for those cases where restorative 
strategies through internal interventions, such as medications (e.g. 
antipsychotic drugs) for improving conditions like meta-cognition 
or mind modelling, may not yet be available. There is no known 
restorative strategy for dementia, for example, but Ienca et al. note 
that a wide range of intelligent assistive technologies are being 
developed to provide general cognitive support aimed at 
“empowering” adults with dementia.40 
 
4. The tight coupling of AI extenders makes it easier to give ‘cognitive 
credit’ to the person for their accomplishments. Returning to the 
case of Lewis, who relies on a device to help him cope with 
symptoms of ADHD that affect his learning, the EMT allows us to 
still credit Lewis as learning, while the regular presence of the 
extender makes it easier (like a pair of glasses). We described Lewis 
as being allowed to use his assistive device during examination, for 
example, which also makes sense under the EMT, as the device is 
really part of the substrate of his cognition. Under the EMT we 
would have to give a similar analysis of the cognitive 
accomplishments of cognitively healthy users of AI extenders as 
well: they deserve credit for what they achieve with their device. 
 
5. Finally, AI extenders can provide more sophisticated resources than 
regular extenders. Consider again the case of BPD discussed above. 
Bray had hypothesized that people with BPD tend to rely on others 
in order to compensate for their internal deficits of executive 
functions because this is the only available option to them, and that 
this explained their characteristic fears of abandonment, and losing 
their autonomy.29 But AI extenders could potentially provide the 
same support for meta-cognitive deficits as other people could, only 
with increased stability and reliability.  Again, this can be a benefit 
in both clinical settings, but also for the cognitively healthy, looking 
to enhance their abilities. 
 
The negative side-effects of AI extenders for mental health can be varied. 
Some of them are also shared by other extenders or cognitive enhancers and 
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are related to the four basic principles of medical ethics—respect for 
autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence,41,42 but others are 
more specific to AI extenders (when used both in clinical settings by the 
cognitively impaired, and for enhancement purposes, by the cognitively 
healthy). The reason is that the use of AI technology and the tight coupling 
of an extender can make interactions less predictable. We will focus on five 
areas of concern: 
 
1. The first consideration is autonomy. In medical ethics, the principle 
of autonomy includes respect for both an individual’s right to decide 
and for the freedom of whether to decide.43 One risk is that, for the 
sake of having the patient under control, some AI extenders will 
make use of interventions and nudges that effectively bypass the 
agent’s right to decide. By encouraging actions without appealing 
to the agent’s rationality (e.g. by presenting them with reasons to 
act), these devices could risk becoming manipulative. These 
scenarios become particularly concerning when we consider the 
technology to be a genuine part of the person’s mind—the 
innermost space of private information, where one’s intentions are 
formed and decisions are made.44 As such, any manipulative 
interventions would  clearly deviate from the maxim of non-
maleficence. Indeed, in the worst case, some of these systems could 
be hacked and used with malicious purposes. 
 
2. In another important sense, autonomy should also protect one’s 
ability to safely act in the ways one decides, ensuring short-term and 
long-term reliability. We can imagine cases of over-reliance in 
which a person is put in risky situations (in terms of mental health), 
by becoming overly dependent on an AI extender which is liable to 
unexpectedly fail, as any technology can. This goes beyond the 
classical problems of cognitive laziness and atrophy that may be 
caused by the use of AI extenders.45,46 A somewhat related concern 
is a scenario in which patients feel so integrated with the extender 
that they resist changes to the system, as these would imply a change 
of personality and cognitive capabilities. 
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3. A third problem derives from an unregulated or recreational use of 
these AI extenders for mental health, where the appropriate 
validation and certification of procedures and tools do not follow 
the standards of medical practice with some other treatments, 
putting beneficence (good practice) at risk. This is particularly 
worrisome when mentally healthy people experiment with AI 
extenders, leading to some pathological mental situations (e.g., 
similar to either substance abuse or dependence syndrome), but with 
some technological and AI components that could be new to the 
analysis. This is also related to the above points on autonomy, as an 
overreliance would negatively affect one’s autonomy. 
 
4. A fourth problem regards moral status and privacy. This goes 
beyond the risk that an extender may be stolen or accessed by a third 
party (or by the clinician or family beyond some established 
parameters)—a risk that applies to essentially any medical device. 
Under the EMT, and AI extender really is a part of the person’s 
mind, and hence gaining access to the personal information stored 
in a device would be like reading the brain of a person, especially 
as these extenders may contain memories, experiences, decisions 
and other very sensitive information.47,48 This is the classic double-
edged sword in AI: while collecting more information about the 
individual can fuel powerful and highly personalised predictions (a 
benefit we discuss above), it also threatens personal privacy.  
 
5. Finally, there may be problems with their allowance in the public 
space caused by a misunderstanding (or strong disagreement) of the 
EMT. This may lead to limitations on when and where these devices 
are allowed (exams, recruitment, etc.), and for how long they can be 
removed (airport security, other hospital treatments, etc.). This is of 
course related to the medical ethical principle of justice, and to the 
question (discussed above in ‘benefits’) of whether we should 
consider AI extenders as cures.  
 
There is a broader concern worth being mentioned, which is common to 
many kinds of enhancement. A widespread use of AI extenders can change 
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our conception of what humans are capable of, and in the particular case of 
mental health, our notion of “mental normality”. As more and more 
capabilities can be enhanced or modified with these devices, the diversity of 
behaviors and capabilities may change as people can increasingly choose 
what cognitive profile they prefer for themselves. The principle of justice 
also demands that we consider future scenarios that could arise for society—
such as a moment when everybody has access to enhancements. 
Determining what profiles are safe for the person (typically in the long term) 
and for society is going to require a deeper understanding of what mental 
health is, to what degree mental conditions are pathological, and what 
enhancements people should be allowed to make. Such considerations are 
well beyond the scope of this chapter, but what is clear is that the notion of 
a “standard” or “normal person”, only comprising what the brain can do, if 
it ever made sense, will likely have to be completely discarded, especially 
when associated with a goal of being “cured”.  
 
 
7    Recommendations  
 
In the previous sections, we have argued that a widespread use of AI 
extenders, and their understanding as such, may have important implications 
in the analysis and practice of mental health. For instance, the attachment of 
a patient with their AI extender can be so close, that any change on the 
device or its software may require a deeper consideration for which the 
professionals involved may not be used to yet. It is then these 
professionals—the designers of AI extenders, coming from different areas 
of engineering and especially AI, and the clinicians, from physicians to 
nurses and other careers—who need a re-understanding of what these AI 
extenders mean for the evolution of the mental health and all the possible 
side-effects on a patient. 
 
The most urgent recommendations should be addressed to AI designers. The 
regulations and expectations that are put on an app or another kind of 
“software” or “hardware” extender should be no less stringent than those put 
on drugs or other kinds of treatment. The reference to take here is similar to 
the area of orthopedics, where manufacturers must include diverse research 
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and development teams, including clinicians, and perform careful tests. 
Likewise for any digital monitoring app, development teams must determine 
an ethically acceptable way of designing these systems so that we can avoid 
these potentially negative effects.40 But AI extenders must be more reliable 
than physical orthopedics. If Helen or Lewis’s AI extenders fail, the 
consequences may be serious and even dangerous; hence, designing for 
safety and reliability is essential. But, on top of this, from the point of view 
of cognitive extensions, the manufacturer must understand that the software 
and the hardware become part of the mind, so no updates, discontinuations 
or access to the data can be done without informed consent. Under a strict 
interpretation of the EM thesis, modifying an AI extender should be 
compared to modifying the brain.  
 
Clinicians, too, must be aware that new gadgets imbued with obscure AI are 
going to become a regular part of their repertoire of diagnostic, treatment 
and monitoring tools. They need to understand their basics, and how they 
couple with the human mind in order to create some new behaviors unseen 
in their careers. A good starting point for training and information for 
clinicians could be based on the six issues raised by Bauer et al.: (1) decide 
when to recommend an extender, (2) observe what other extenders the 
patients use (and consider how different extenders might potentially 
interact), (3) understand how their monitoring works, (4) explain the effects 
to the patients, (5) keep themselves informed about the state of the art of AI 
extenders, and (6) scrutinize and validate them.49 With the inception of 
technology, and especially AI, human minds are changing, and mental 
health must change too, in terms of categories and the consideration of 
normality. Even if clinicians are not familiar with the philosophical 
underpinnings of the EMT, they know well what orthopedics is, and 
understand the feeling of many patients that an artificial arm, say, is a real 
arm. A similar analogy can be used for AI extenders, but going beyond the 
idea of mimicking the original functions exactly, in the same way that a 
titanium leg may be more effective and elegant than a more realistic plastic 
prosthetic. 
 
Finally, there are many future directions for research for a better 
understanding of AI extenders in the context of mental health, for which this 
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chapter is just a beginning. Tab. 2, and future refinements, can be used to 
spot gaps and limitations, or ways in which some devices can be used for 
some other conditions. But beyond each particular set of capabilities and 
conditions, we need more general guidelines, methodologies and well-
designed experiments to help in the development of the future AI extenders 
used for mental health. The EMT can leverage this research, but we also 
need better structural incentives to create intelligent assistive health 
technologies, rather than focusing only on biological causes and cures.  
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APPENDIX A  
The following table includes the search tokens that we used to look for the 
conditions in the ICD-10 blue book for each capability, in order to construct 
Table 2 in the chapter. 
 
Cognitive capability Tokens used for the search in the ICD-10 
Memory processes memor* 
Sensorimotor interaction sensor*, moto* 
Visual processing visu*, percept* 
Auditory processing audi*, percept* 
Attention and search atten* 
Planning plan*, organiz* 
Comprehension and expression expres*, compre* 
Communication commun*, lang*  
Emotion and self-control emot*, control* and affect* 
Navigation  orient*, naviga* 
Conceptualization, learning and 
abstraction 
learn*, conceptual* 
Quantitative and logical reasoning calculat*, mathemat* 
Mind modeling and social 
interaction 
social* 
Metacognition aware*, capab*, limitations, conscio*, self-
*, incompetent 
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